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Introduction  
Collaborative growth initiatives have emerged over the last 20 years between public institutions 
and private actors.  A public-private partnership (PPP) exists where the public and private sector 
partners share resources, responsibility and risk for the public service provision (Klijn, 2010).  In 
an attempt to improve service delivery efficiency, lower costs, secure innovation, increase 
customer satisfaction and attract private funding, governments have embraced PPPs (Hofmeister 
and Borchert, 2004).  Typically, in a PPP, the private sector partner constructs or renovates an 
asset, such as a stadium or a hospital, at its own expense.  A private party then assumes 
responsibility for the public service delivery with the use of this asset for a certain time that often 
ranges between 10 and 30 years.  To recover its investment and operating expenses (e.g., for the 
service provision and facility maintenance), a private company receives user fees and/or 
payments from the government (Mouraviev et al., 2012).    
PPP development in Kazakhstan began in 2006 when the government adopted the law on 
concessions.  Subsequently, the government formed the National PPP Centre and two regional 
centres and approved seven PPP projects, although later some have shut down (Mouraviev et al., 
2012).  This article highlights PPP implementation in Kazakhstan in the literature review section.  
Despite government efforts to expand PPP implementation in Kazakhstan, private investor 
interest remains small and the number of partnerships is not increasing (Kazakhstan Public-
Private Partnership Centre, 2011; Mouraviev, 2012).  What are the impediments to swift PPP 
employment in the nation?  What are the obstacles that reduce the efficiency of PPP operations?   
The article explains the principal legal and regulatory barriers to effective PPP governance 
in Kazakhstan.  With the use of data from in-depth interviews, the article's objective is to identify 
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and critically assess constraints to PPP development and effective management that relate to 
imperfections in partnership laws and regulations.     
The article begins with the literature review from which we develop propositions.  The 
review highlights PPP implementation in Kazakhstan and focuses on two themes that are critical 
for PPP development in the nation.  We then outline the research methodology and move on to 
discuss the findings in two areas including the legal and institutional framework for PPP 
governance and the role of government regulation for successful PPP management.  In each 
theme, we test a certain proposition and draw a conclusion regarding whether the study confirms 
a proposition.  The concluding section highlights the significance of some legal and regulatory 
barriers to PPP development as opposed to others.  We close by elucidating the article's 
contribution to theory, research methodology and praxis.           
     
Literature review and propositions  
Highlights of PPPs in Kazakhstan and theme selection   
A large body of literature focuses on PPP development in transitional countries (see, for 
example, Pongsiri, 2003; Jamali, 2004a; Bult-Spiering and Dewulf, 2006; Urio, 2010; 
Mouraviev, 2012), whilst these studies typically emphasise organisational and financial 
arrangements that underpin partnerships.  Studies that reflect the beginning partnership 
development stage and emerging Kazakhstan's PPP experience are rare (see, for example, 
Mouraviev et al., 2012; Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2013, 2014).  In Kazakhstan, the 
government-formed PPPs are all in a concession form.  In the transportation sector these include 
a railroad in Eastern Kazakhstan between Shar and Ust-Kamenogorsk and an airport in Aktau.  
In the energy sector, there is the construction and operation of an inter-regional electrical grid 
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between Northern Kazakhstan and the Aktobe region.  In the social sector, there is the 
construction and operation of eleven kindergartens in Karaganda (Kazakhstan Public-Private 
Partnership Centre, 2011).  Moreover, the Kazakhstan government plans a large number of PPP 
projects such as toll roads, hospitals, schools and kindergartens (Kazakhstan Public-Private 
Partnership Centre, 2011).  Table 1 summarises available information about concessions that the 
Kazakhstan government has approved.  
 Table 1. Concessions approved by the Kazakhstani government as of January 2014  
 
No. Project title 
Project 
cost 
(million 
U.S. 
dollars) 
Concession 
term 
Project status 
Organisational 
arrangement 
with 
government:  
public sector 
partner 
1 
Construction and 
operation of a railroad 
between the station of 
Shar and the city of 
Ust-Kamenogorsk in 
Eastern Kazakhstan   
$202.5 23 years,  
from 2005 
Concession 
contract signed 
6 July, 2005.  
Construction 
has been 
completed; 
services are 
being provided 
Kazakhstan Temir 
Zholy (100% 
government-
owned national 
railroad company) 
and Investment 
Fund of 
Kazakhstan (the 
government 
agency) 
2 
Construction and 
operation of inter-
regional electrical grid 
from Northern 
Kazakhstan to Aktobe 
region 
 
$165.82 17 years,  
from 2005 
Concession 
contract signed 
28 December, 
2005.  
Construction 
has been 
completed; 
services are 
being provided 
Kazakhstan 
Electric Grid 
Operating 
Company 
(KEGOC) – 
100% 
government-
owned national 
power 
transmission 
company  
3 
Construction and 
operation of the 
passenger terminal of 
an international airport 
in the city of Aktau  
$65.5 30 years,    
from 2008 
Concession 
contract signed 
3 December, 
2007. 
Construction 
has been 
completed; 
Regional 
government of the 
Mangistausskaya 
oblast’  
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services are 
being provided   
4 
Construction and 
operation of eleven 
kindergartens in the 
city of Karaganda 
$39.12 
14 years, 
from 2011 
Concession 
contract signed 
in November 
2011. 
Construction is 
on hold   
Regional 
government of the 
Karagandinskaya 
oblast' 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors from Tilebaldinov, 2008; Kazakhstan Public-Private 
Partnership Centre, 2011; Regional Centre for Public-Private Partnership of the 
Karagandinskaya Oblast’, 2011; Mouraviev et al., 2012, p. 413. 
 
As the progress with PPP formation in Kazakhstan is slow (i.e., there are just three active 
PPP projects since 2005 and one project is currently on hold), the question regarding constraints 
and impediments to partnership proliferation becomes increasingly important.  This section 
focuses on two themes that have critical importance for rapid PPP implementation in developing 
economies including: 
 legal and institutional framework as a critical success factor for PPP governance; and 
 the role of government regulation for successful PPP management. 
The two themes emerged from the interviews in connection with the study's propositions and we 
selected them for the study because of the significance that the interviewees attached to them.  
After we highlight the literature pertinent to each theme, we develop a proposition from the 
literature.  We then test the study's propositions against the research findings in order to better 
understand constraints and impediments to effective PPP governance in Kazakhstan.   
 
Legal and institutional framework as a PPP critical success factor    
This theme in the PPP literature highlights the significance of the legal and institutional 
framework for the partnership development.  The critical success factors (CSFs) are those 
principal areas that are crucial for reaching the stated project's goals (Rockart, 1982).  Many 
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researchers and official guidelines point out the significance of creating a clear legal framework 
and solid institutional basis for successful PPP project initiation and implementation (Boyfield, 
1992; Stein, 1995; Guidelines for successful public-private partnerships, 2003; Klijn and 
Teisman, 2003; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Harris, 2004; Guidebook on promoting good 
governance in public–private partnerships, 2008; Mouraviev et al., 2012).   
Some legal framework issues are common for emerging economies, such as the protection 
of the private sector interests; bureaucracy involved in obtaining permits and consents; and 
excessive restrictions on public procurement that may seriously undermine PPP implementation 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2004).  The first and foremost prerequisite for PPP development is to adopt 
relevant national PPP laws that set the basic framework for partnership formation and permit the 
government authorities to engage in a PPP arrangement and extend long term payment 
guarantees (Mouraviev et al., 2012).  For example, Ismail (2013) identified a favourable legal 
framework as one of the top CSFs of PPP implementation.        
Additionally, a critical condition for successful partnership development is establishing the 
national PPP unit as a centre that provides a methodology and guidance for project selection and 
design; assists in contract preparation and project assessment; and facilitates the general PPP 
activity, e.g., by initiating necessary changes in legislation and regulations (Asian Development 
Bank, 2008; Guidebook on Promoting Good Governance in Public–Private Partnerships, 2008). 
Much discussion regarding the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for PPP 
development is country-specific (see, for example, Qiao et al., 2001; Jefferies et al., 2002; Klijn 
and Teisman, 2003; Li et al., 2005; Mouraviev, 2012), whilst generalisations are hardly possible 
because the contextual political, economic, legislative, social and cultural environment shape the 
unique features of each nation's PPP framework.  Owing to the uniqueness of each country's 
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setting, delineation of commonalities and differences in PPP frameworks between countries is 
normally beyond the researchers' scope.  However, a promising research opportunity manifests 
itself in the field of cross-country comparisons of PPP critical success factors including those 
that relate to the legal and institutional framework.  This opportunity is particularly relevant to 
research in countries such as Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine because they share a common 
Soviet legacy, including Russian as a widely spoken language, similar educational, cultural and 
social realities, and aligned economic, financial, taxation, regulatory and customs systems (Urio, 
2010; Mouraviev et al., 2012), although the contextual environment may still dominate the 
design of the legal framework.      
To summarise, the PPP literature emphasises a need for governments to create a solid legal 
and institutional basis for PPP development (Qiao et al., 2001; Jamali, 2004a; Urio, 2010), 
although borrowing legal and organisational solutions from another country's experience is 
hardly possible due to the critical significance of the political, social and economic context.  
Realising a need to set the basic framework for partnership formation, the government in 
Kazakhstan adopted a national law on concessions in 2006 (The Law of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan “On Concessions", 2006) and formed the key elements of an institutional PPP 
framework, including the National PPP Centre in 2008, and two regional PPP centres (in the 
Karagandinskaya oblast' in 2010 and the Vostochno-Kazakhstanskaya oblast' in 2011).  After 
the government has seemingly designed critical elements of the nation's PPP legal and 
institutional framework, which is what the literature suggests, the government anticipates faster 
PPP development in the country.  Hence, the literature review permits us to put forward the 
following propositions:  
 8
P1: The government in Kazakhstan supports extensive PPP development by designing a clear 
and effective PPP legal framework. 
P1b: The national government of Kazakhstan unambiguously supports PPP development, 
without compromising the future of partnerships. 
 
The role of government regulation for successful PPP management 
The government regulation in PPPs depends on an industry’s nature.  The government regulates 
some sectors, such as the oil and gas sector, more, whilst other sectors may enjoy less regulation.  
The nature and scope of government regulation including price setting, determination of import 
and export quotas and customs duties, environmental control, safety standards and administrative 
procedures influence interaction between PPP partners.  However, studies conclude that in some 
sectors, such as construction, the involved parties pay little attention to PPPs’ relational aspects 
and rather focus on contractual arrangements in which the government spells out its regulations 
(Egan, 1998; Doree, 2004; Bult-Spiering and Dewulf, 2006).   
The scope and tools of government regulation play a certain role in PPP management.  
Teisman and Klijn (2002) argue that government organisations may view PPP complexities as a 
threat.  In this case, the government is likely to use traditional decision-making procedures that 
typically apply to contracting-out schemes.  'The interaction with the private sector can be 
defined in terms of a principal–agent relation.  The government decides what it wants and the 
private sector decides what it can deliver and at what price' (Teisman and Klijn, 2002, p. 199).  
Hence, the government may choose to strictly regulate PPP tariffs, parameters of the service 
delivery, PPP budget, a number of employees and other elements of PPP business.  Some 
regulated elements, such as tariffs and the service quality features, are part of output, rather than 
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input, specification, which scholars view as a PPP distinct advantage because it permits a private 
operator to innovate and find the most efficient solutions to deliver the specified public service 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000).   
Output specification in PPPs, which defines the service’s elements and its delivery 
parameters, becomes more important than input specification, i.e., how much a private partner 
has to spend on asset construction or maintenance, how exactly the construction should be done 
or how many staff should be hired (Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008, p. 116).  Hence, output 
management in PPPs, as opposed to input-oriented management in the public sector that focuses 
on institutions (Bult-Spiering and Dewulf, 2006), may have significant positive influence on the 
overall PPP performance.  As the government sets the output specifications, it is in the position 
to increase or decrease its influence on successful PPP management.      
Other partnership specifications, such as number of employees in a PPP and their wage 
rates, refer to partnership inputs, which the government may also choose to regulate.  However, 
the literature does not provide evidence that this kind of government regulation is one of the 
success factors for PPPs.  Researchers conducted a considerable number of studies that identified 
critical factors that ensure management success in PPPs in the context of different economies 
including the UK, China, India, Egypt, Lebanon and Malaysia, among others (see, for example, 
Gupta and Narasimham, 1998; Jamali, 2004b; Zhang, 2005; Jacobson and Choi, 2008; Chan et 
al., 2004; Li et al., 2005; Chan et al., 2010; Gupta et al., 2013).  None of the studies identified 
any significance of the government regulation for effective PPP management, whilst certain 
findings pointed out exactly the opposite, such as the importance of 'entrepreneurship and 
leadership’ (Tiong, 1996) and 'built-in flexibility for future growth and changes' (Gupta and 
Narasimham, 1998).   
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Hence, empirical evidence reflected in the literature does not support a need for the 
government to regulate PPP inputs, as opposed to the PPP output specification by the 
government, which the literature views as highly desirable because it offers incentives to a 
private partner to perform better.  From the literature appraisal on the theme of government 
regulation we develop the following two propositions:   
P2a: Effective government regulation of PPP tariffs has positive impact on partnership 
management and overall PPP performance.   
P2b: The government regulation of PPP workers' wage rates has negative impact on 
partnership management.   
In order to test our propositions we conducted a qualitative study that embraces interviewees 
from PPP projects in Kazakhstan as well as from national and regional PPP centres.  The article 
moves on to discuss the research methodology, and then delineates the research findings.      
 
Research methodology    
The data collection method in this qualitative study is in-depth semi-structured interviews.  The 
study participants include eleven respondents from two PPP projects and two government 
agencies as follows: 
 a PPP that involves constructing and operating a railroad segment in Eastern Kazakhstan 
(four interviewees including department managers and senior experts);  
 a PPP aimed at constructing and maintaining eleven kindergartens in the city of 
Karaganda (two interviewees both of whom are managers); 
 the National PPP Centre in Astana, the capital city (three respondents including a 
department head and senior experts); and 
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 the Regional PPP Centre of the Karagandinskaya oblast' (two respondents both of whom 
are senior experts).    
The study employed a purposeful sampling with the goal of selecting those interviewees 
who are in the position to discuss the projects, their issues and possible solutions (Patton, 2002; 
Neuman, 2007).  The overall picture of the study participants includes: 
 project workers at the senior level (head of a department or a section), 
 project staff members at the level of a lead expert (e.g., an expert in a tariff setting or 
procurement) and 
 experts from PPP centres in an advisory role.  
 Table 2 summarises the study's sample. 
 
 Table 2.  Research sample: Details of organisations and respondents   
An organisation or a project  Number of  
participants 
Participant's position 
 
PPP contractor (railroad 
construction and operation) 
 
4 
 Department managers 
 Senior experts 
PPP contractor (kindergartens' 
construction and operation) 
 
2 
 Company managers 
National PPP Centre 
 
3 
 Department head 
 Senior experts 
 
 12
Regional PPP Centre 
 
2 
 Senior experts 
Total: 11  
  Source: Compiled by the authors.  
Although the sample size is relatively small, it nevertheless has allowed us to successfully 
reach data saturation (Patton, 2002; Flick, 2009).  There was no major discrepancy in the 
interview data which the study participants from the private sector organisations provided.  
Additionally, the government sector employees commonly shared opinions and perceptions 
between them.  However, the study has identified the contradictory points of view between the 
public sector workers, on the one hand, and the private sector workers, on the other.  In this 
study, the contradictory experiences and perceptions served as a data triangulation method 
(Neuman, 2007; Flick, 2009), which allowed us to contrast and compare the data from different 
sources, hence, ensuring data validity.      
The study's research approach is based on the two propositions that we have generated from 
the literature appraisal and then tested against the findings that we have unveiled during in-depth 
interviews.  The following section presents the research findings and includes the comments 
regarding whether the study confirms a relevant proposition.     
 
Research findings  
We have categorised the interview data by the following themes:   
• Irregularities in the PPP legal framework; and  
• Issues of tariff and wage-rate setting. 
 13
Each theme relates to a proposition that we have developed from the literature, and the detailed 
discussion follows.     
 
Irregularities in the PPP legal framework and lack of government commitment to PPPs: 
testing Propositions 1a and 1b 
In this theme, we highlight certain issues in the legal and institutional framework that remain 
unresolved in Kazakhstan.  Interviewees pointed out irregularities in the legal framework that 
governs PPPs.  In Kazakhstan, there is no general law that defines a PPP, its legal status and the 
principal legal provisions governing PPP employment in the country.  The law on concessions 
that the nation adopted in 2006 filled the legal gap only in part (The Law of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan “On Concessions", 2006).  Interviewees asserted that the law on concessions is 
incomplete and is not harmonised with other national laws.  In particular, the law on concessions 
contradicts the provisions of the budget law that permit the government to extend the payment 
guarantees for a maximum of three years.  The following quote shows that a public 
organisation’s commitment, especially at the regional level, to extend payments to a PPP during 
a long period is highly questionable. 
‘When a regional government grants a concession for many years, how can it guarantee 
that it will actually pay?  It gives its guarantee in writing, but where can it get the 
money in the future?  The regional government gets funds from the national 
government, but the national government does not give any guarantee.  This is 
confusing, isn't it?’ 
Participant 1   
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Another interviewee expressed similar concerns regarding the validity of long-term PPP 
contracts that regional governments sign: 
‘Regions [in Kazakhstan] don't impose their own taxes.  The regional governments are 
financed by the national government.  The latter decides how much money each region 
receives.  So, when a region engages itself in partnerships, it essentially counts on more 
money from the national government in the future.  But who can argue with confidence 
that the national government will give this money to the region?’  
Participant 4    
In Kazakhstan, the high degree of political and administrative centralisation leads to some 
contradictions within the PPP legal framework, namely between the national and regional 
legislation.  An interviewee describes the problem as follows: 
‘Some regions [in Kazakhstan] have formed their own PPP centres and adopted 
regional rules and regulations.  I'm not sure that these regulations are really helpful.  
Kazakhstan has a unitary system.  Everything is prescribed by the national government.  
Regional regulations may simply repeat the national laws, but the former may not 
replace the latter, and may not fill some existing gaps in the national legislation.  For 
example, the national law does not specify what a PPP means or what an asset life 
cycle contract means.  So, the regional law cannot help here at all.'   
Participant 11    
Another interviewee asserted that the government tools and possibilities for supporting 
and/or penalising a PPP are vaguely defined and their implementation is lacking procedures and 
guidelines. 
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‘I think the government staff sometimes simply don't know what [legal provisions] they 
can apply to a PPP and what they can't apply.  They always refer to the law, but there 
is more than one law governing partnerships.  They point to one law for some reason 
and then they say about another one: 'No, we cannot use these provisions'.  Normally – 
unfortunately – there are no explanations.’   
Participant 9    
Findings in this theme support the notions expressed in the literature regarding the 
significance of a clear legal, regulatory and institutional framework for PPP development 
(Boyfield, 1992; Stein, 1995; Osborne, 2000; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Ismail, 2013).  Where 
the private sector partners are concerned with reliability of government payment guarantees to 
PPPs over the long term, this inevitably diminishes the private investors’ interest.  The same 
applies to the ambiguity of national and regional PPP laws and regulations: the larger the 
ambiguity, the smaller the private investors' interest, as the literature asserts (Mouraviev, 2012).       
In summary, the range of the regional government's privileges and responsibilities regarding 
PPP formation and management remains ambiguous.  These privileges and responsibilities are 
even less clear at the municipal government level.  This suggests that PPP development at the 
country's local level may be stalled.  
Hence, the study findings have not confirmed Proposition 1a, which we generated from the 
literature, that the government in Kazakhstan supports extensive PPP development by designing 
a clear and effective PPP legal framework.  In contrast to Proposition 1a, the findings 
demonstrated that lack of progress with PPP development in Kazakhstan stems, in part, from 
imperfections in the PPP legal and institutional framework.   Also, the findings demonstrated 
ambiguity of Kazakhstan's state government in relation to PPPs.  The national government 
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allows regional and local authorities to launch PPPs and engage in contractually binding 
relations (including obligations to pay PPPs), but without a clear commitment from the central 
state authority.  Naturally, this makes PPPs and their future unclear and uncertain. Hence, the 
study findings have not confirmed Proposition 1b. 
  
The role of government regulation in PPP management: testing Proposition 2 
Proposition 2 includes two parts: one refers to the government regulation of PPP tariffs, whilst 
the other refers to the regulation of the PPP staff’s wage rates.      
 
P2a: Effective government regulation of PPP tariffs has positive impact on partnership 
management and overall PPP performance.   
Interviewees noted that among the legal and regulatory barriers to effective PPP governance, in 
their experience, bureaucratic tariff regulations for partnership services was one of the biggest 
challenges.  This often falls in the domain of the country's anti-monopoly agency.  Interviewees 
believe that tariff setting is lengthy, criteria for approvals are blurred and the procedures are 
cumbersome.  An interviewee suggests the following: 
‘There should be a totally different process for tariff setting.  The anti-monopoly agency 
may need to monitor tariffs.  However, the tariff setting should not be between an 
operator and the anti-monopoly agency.  It should be between a service provider and 
customers.  At this point, there are no negotiations between a supplier and a customer.  
So, how does the anti-monopoly agency know what tariff level it should deem 
acceptable and what level is unacceptable?’ 
  Participant 2    
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Another interviewee reinforces the importance of direct tariff setting between a PPP 
operator and a customer: 
‘We [a PPP operator] formed a tariff that is much higher than the allowed limit.  But we 
are convinced that this is the right tariff.  However, the anti-monopoly agency allows an 
actual tariff to exceed what it considers a 'target tariff' by no more than 5%.  Well, we 
got the fine from the agency for exceeding the 5% limit.  I don't really understand who 
needs these 'target tariffs' and why we [an operator] have to pay the fine.  What 
company will want to be in business like that, where some government agency regulates 
its prices?’    
Participant 1    
The above excerpt shows an interviewee's clearly negative perception of the government’s 
bureaucratic tariff regulation in cases where tariff setting is a part of anti-trust policy and is a 
responsibility of the public anti-monopoly agency.  In contrast to this perception, a staff member 
in the National PPP Centre argues the following: 
‘Without government regulation tariffs may increase very quickly.  Think about a 
railroad, for example.  A railroad operator is a monopolist and its tariffs may be very 
high.  I don't think that customers will appreciate this.’      
Participant 6    
The interviews have highlighted two varying perspectives on tariffs.  The first perspective 
focuses on the perceived need for PPP operators to deal directly with clients, so that two parties 
may be able to negotiate tariffs directly, i.e., without government involvement.  The other 
perspective focuses on desirable pricing for users and takes into account that PPPs may engage 
in monopoly pricing, which may be damaging for users of partnership services.  The first 
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perspective is associated with the needs of a private operator (i.e., when it pushes for higher 
tariffs in order to generate higher revenue), whilst the second perspective is societal (when the 
government aims to ensure that public services remain low-priced and, hence, affordable for all 
users.   
The study revealed that the two perspectives – that of a private operator and the societal 
perspective – are opposing.  From the operator's perspective, the government regulations 
seriously limit a private partner's possibilities to maximise profit.  Interviewees from the private 
sector asserted that the government regulation of partnership tariffs does not effectively 
contribute to PPP management.  They argued that, as a result of government regulation, certain 
PPP advantages, such as a profit-driven private partner's initiative that aims at finding most 
efficient solutions, are largely lost.  To summarise, those interviewees who emphasised the 
operators' perspective ("PPP operators should be able to directly negotiate tariffs with clients") in 
effect called for loosening government regulations and giving private firms greater flexibility in 
tariff setting.   
In contrast, from the societal perspective the government pursues a goal of keeping prices 
for the public services low.  As a PPP often becomes a monopoly, the government is interested in 
regulating monopolistically provided services in order to not allow monopolistic trends to 
emerge and grow, namely in the field of price setting.  From this perspective, which is societal, 
rather than corporate, the tight government regulation of tariffs contributes to the overall PPP 
successful performance as the citizens would benefit from low-priced privately provided public 
services.  As the societal perspective prevails over corporate, the study has confirmed 
Proposition 2a.   
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The following comments aim to emphasise the effectiveness of government regulation of 
PPP tariffs. As Kazakhstan's economic development has been accompanied by relatively high 
inflation rate of seven to eight per cent a year for a long time (i.e. longer than 10 years), the 
government is naturally concerned with how to combat inflationary pressures.  Whilst prices 
within the public sector remain under the central government control and PPPs are subjected to 
the public sector's regulations, the government uses price controls to keep prices for public 
services low.  Not only it ensures affordable prices for users, both individual and corporate, but 
also it quite effectively curbs inflationary processes in the nation.  Furthermore, by not allowing 
the public sector companies including PPPs to raise tariffs, the government creates incentives for 
these companies to reduce costs, optimise their cost structure and seek ways to increase their 
own efficiency.  Hence, the findings confirmed Proposition P2a, i.e. that the government 
regulation of PPP tariffs should be viewed as effective and the one that has positive impact on 
partnership performance.   
                       
P2b: The government regulation of PPP workers' wage rates has negative impact on 
partnership management.   
In Kazakhstan, another area that the Agency for Regulation of Natural Monopolies keeps under 
its tight control is wage rates.  The latter are subject to regulation in cases where a government-
owned company, even in part, has formed a PPP operator.  For interviewees, it remains unclear 
why the government needs to regulate the operator's wage rates.  An interviewee provides the 
following comment: 
‘If we set our wage rates ourselves, what's wrong with that?  With or without 
government regulation, we have to pay our workers at market rates; otherwise no one 
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would want to work for us.  We also need to pay bonuses for good performance.  Again, 
nothing is wrong with that because it's a standard practice.  So, why government 
regulation?  How does it help? And whom?’   
Participant 3    
The excerpt shows that the interviewee is not supportive of government regulation and 
perceives it as an impediment to the operator's flexibility regarding hiring and retaining a 
qualified workforce.  His comment implies that the wage rate–setting power should belong to an 
operator.  In contrast, another interviewee who works for the regional PPP Centre expressed a 
different opinion regarding why the government regulates wage rates of PPP staff:      
‘There is a concern in the government that a PPP may pay high wages to its own 
workers, which means that the PPP costs will be rising.  This may drive PPP prices up 
and customers may be disadvantaged.’    
   Participant 7    
However, most interviewees took a different view, i.e., that a PPP should be able to set wage 
rates on its own, based on prevailing market rates in order to attract the most capable employees. 
The findings are aligned with the literature about the meaning and principal advantages of the 
PPP arrangements: it is the private partner's initiative driven by the profit motive that permits a 
PPP to find the most efficient business solutions and cut costs whilst it delivers the public service 
(Colman, 2000; Hofmeister and Borchert, 2004; Klijn, 2010; Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2012).  
Once this initiative is constrained, the core advantage of engaging the private sector partner in 
the delivery of public services becomes severely undermined (Wettenhall, 2003; Williams, 
2003).  When the government regulation does not permit a private operator to hire and retain the 
most capable workers at market wage rates, this may lead to the PPP's inability to employ 
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qualified staff and is likely to have negative impact on the PPP’s overall performance.  Hence, 
the study has confirmed Proposition 2b.    
 
Study summary 
Table 3 summarises the study's propositions, relevant findings and whether the study has 
confirmed a proposition.   
 
 Table 3. The study's propositions and findings   
 
Propositions Findings  Comments 
P1a: The government in 
Kazakhstan supports extensive 
PPP development by designing a 
clear and effective PPP legal 
framework. 
 
 
Lack of progress with PPP 
development in Kazakhstan 
stems, in part, from 
imperfections in the PPP legal 
framework.   
The study has not confirmed P1a.  
In Kazakhstan, there is no 
general law that defines a PPP, 
its legal status and the principal 
legal provisions governing PPP 
implementation in the country. 
The law on concessions is 
incomplete and is not harmonised 
with other laws. Regional PPP 
regulations and procedures are 
ambiguous.   
P1b: The national government of 
Kazakhstan unambiguously 
supports PPP development, 
without compromising the future 
of partnerships. 
 
There is ambiguity of 
Kazakhstan's state government in 
relation to PPPs. The national 
government allows regional and 
local authorities to launch PPPs 
and engage in contractually 
binding relations, but without a 
clear commitment from the 
central state authority.   
The study has not confirmed P1b.  
Some interviewees view long-
term PPP contracts as legally 
invalid. Naturally, this makes 
PPPs and their future unclear and 
uncertain.  
P2a: Effective government 
regulation of PPP tariffs has a 
positive impact on partnership 
management and overall PPP 
performance.   
 
The government aims to ensure 
provision of affordable public 
services and a slow down of 
inflationary pressure in the 
economy.  
The study has confirmed P2a.  
From the societal perspective, the 
tight government tariff regulation 
contributes to successful PPP 
performance as the citizens 
would benefit from low-priced 
public services.   
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P2b: The government regulation 
of PPP workers' wage rates has 
negative impact on partnership 
management.   
The private partner's initiative 
driven by the profit motive 
appears severely constrained.  
 
The study has confirmed P2b. 
The government seriously 
constrains a private partner's 
flexibility in management by not 
permitting a private operator to 
hire and retain the most capable 
workers at market wage rates.  
 Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion  
Based on the thorough analysis of partnerships in both industrialised nations and emerging 
markets, Grimsey and Lewis (2004) convincingly argue that PPPs should be seen as a process of 
identifying the service needs and matching them with the most efficient delivery mechanisms.  'If 
this process is applied rigorously to each contract, then it will inevitably result in a different 
approach for every project' (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004, p. 245).  As the study's findings showed, 
many interviewees tended to disregard or downplay the case-by-case approach to PPP 
implementation.  Instead, they mostly focused on creating the basic conditions for PPPs, such as 
the legal and institutional framework and streamlining government tariff setting.  This means that 
certain principal elements in the PPP governance in Kazakhstan are currently missing (e.g., the 
general law that would define a PPP) or require serious improvement (e.g., PPP tariff and wage 
rate setting).  
The interviewees placed much emphasis on ensuring greater private party flexibility in 
business management.  Justifying restrictions on PPP operations, such as government regulation 
of contractor workers' wage rates, is a challenging endeavor.  In a market-oriented economy, 
attracting a highly qualified workforce requires each company to pay workers at market or 
above-market rates, whilst administrative restrictions may simply lead to staff attrition.  From 
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this perspective, government regulation of wage rates seems excessive and unnecessary and is 
difficult to justify.        
However, in another area of partner interaction – tariff setting – interviewees expressed the 
private operators' perspective that we view as opportunistic because operators call for tariff 
setting directly between themselves and customers, without an approval from the anti-monopoly 
agency.  As partnerships' services are often monopolistic (e.g., a railroad, a toll road, a water-
treatment facility or a stadium), the risk of market failure where a monopoly increases the price 
without losing customers is high (Stiglitz, 2000; Hyman, 2002).  The threat of monopolistic 
manipulation with the service price, quality and quantity requires mitigation by the government 
regulation of tariffs; otherwise citizens may witness shrinking volumes and rising prices for 
traditional public services.  Hence, we should view the government tariff regulation as effective 
in terms of reducing the private partners' opportunistic behaviour, i.e. pursuit of self-interest.  
Nevertheless, the government should ensure that procedures for submitting and processing new 
tariff applications are streamlined and shortened.  
It is worth noting the significance of another perspective that interviewees emphasised, 
namely that PPP operators should be able to directly negotiate tariffs with clients. At the 
moment, calls for loosening government regulations in tariff setting in Kazakhstan are premature 
as the nation is a highly centralised economy.  However, interviewees have highlighted the future 
of the PPP governance in which the scope of central government's regulation is likely to 
significantly decrease.  Whilst at present time operators' push for less government regulation 
may be viewed as pursuit of self-interest as it allows to easier raise tariffs, from the long-term 
perspective the operators' vision of direct tariff negotiation between a service provider and a 
customer is aligned with the nation's intent to build a market-oriented economy.   
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The creation of effective provider–customer relations might serve as a reliable foundation 
from which demand for PPP services evolves.  Currently, PPP deployment is facilitated by the 
government acting as strong launching customer. For example, in a PPP that has built and now 
operates a 120-km railroad in Eastern Kazakhstan, the government-owned railroad company 
called Kazakhstan Temir Zholy serves in two capacities: it was one of the principal partners and 
investors in a PPP and it is also a customer as it now buys a large volume of transportation 
services that this PPP provides.                      
Looking ahead at how tariff regulation can be handled in the long run, a range of 
opportunities can be provided by political development in Kazakhstan, in particular, by the 
transition from a unitary state to a decentralised unitary state. Examples of the latter include 
nations, such as Belgium and the Netherlands (Toonen, 1987; Hulst, 2005). As transition to a 
decentralised unitary state often incorporates economic decentralisation, this implies a shift of 
functions from the public sector to the private sector due to privatisation and deregulation 
(Toonen, 1987; Hulst, 2005). Whilst in a decentralised unitary state certain decisions still are 
made at the national level, local and regional governments have extensive privileges in decision-
making and, hence, many issues including tariff setting for partnerships can be negotiated easier 
and faster. In a more complete form of a decentralised unitary state, tariff setting might become a 
matter of direct negotiations between a PPP operator and clients, although at present time in 
Kazakhstan it is hardly possible.             
The article contributes to PPP theory as the management of co-production (Klijn and 
Teisman, 2005) by highlighting the limitations of the government's management approach that it 
borrowed from its own experience of treating the private sector organisations and that the 
government applied to PPPs.  As the study showed, the management approach to PPPs that 
 25
Kazakhstan's government currently uses manifests itself in a large number of drawbacks, such as 
constrained management flexibility of private operators, losses in their efficiency due to 
cumbersome government-set procedures (e.g., bureaucratic tariff setting and excessive 
procurement restrictions) and disincentives to private operators' to better manage a property due 
to deliberate restriction that prohibits private asset ownership.  By elucidating multiple examples 
of overregulation and PPPs' inefficiency, the article demonstrates that the government 
dominance in PPP management is conceptually inappropriate.  Instead, the government should 
adopt the concept of co-production and manage its relations with the private sector partner in a 
collaborative fashion.         
Identifying the partners' perspectives on a range of PPP management issues was successful 
due to research methodology that we adopted for this study.  To the best of the authors' 
knowledge, this study is the first to develop propositions from the literature and then test them by 
using a phenomenological, or an interpretive approach (Neuman, 2007) to examine the 
subjective experiences and perceptions of PPP actors in Kazakhstan.  Furthermore, in the broader 
PPP management field, studies that are based on the development of propositions that are 
subsequently tested by qualitative, rather than quantitative, data are rare.  Hence, this research 
contributes to qualitative inquiry within the PPP management's body of knowledge by making a 
methodological contribution.  
Additionally, the article contributes to praxis along two dimensions.  The first dimension is 
the set of legal and institutional impediments to effective PPP management that the findings have 
identified.  Resolving legal irregularities might drastically improve the legal PPP framework's 
clarity and, hence, attract more private investors.  Additionally, consistent government efforts to 
improve the legislative and institutional environment for PPPs would clearly demonstrate the 
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central government's commitment to partnerships including meeting its own financial obligations 
to private operators, which would attract additional investment.  The second dimension of 
contribution to practice stems from a range of examples regarding how the government 
overregulates the private sector partners.  The most salient examples that the findings have 
highlighted include cumbersome tariff setting procedures (although we view the government 
regulations of tariffs as highly needed), disincentives to a private operator due to its inability to 
set wage rates for its workers according to the market conditions.  Practitioners, particularly 
those in the public agencies, have to be concerned with ways to reduce the government 
overregulation of the private operators, which is likely to result in greater PPP flexibility in 
management and, ultimately, higher efficiency in delivering the public services.   
As this qualitative study is based on a relatively small sample, future research may 
overcome this limitation by embracing a larger sample and use quantitative data analysis 
methods to empirically test the findings.  Additionally, future studies may focus on the themes 
that were beyond the scope of this article, such as the impact of risk allocation on PPP 
implementation, the role of government political and financial support for PPP expansion and the 
impact of partners' commitment and trust on building successful partnerships.   
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